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Poor Man Wanna Be Rich, Rich Man Wanna Be King
1
 
The Battle to Legalize Sports Betting in The Garden State 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 On January 17, 2012, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie signed into law a resolution 
that would permit betting on sports at New Jersey casinos and racetracks.
2
 This action 
contravened a federal law, the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 
(PASPA), which presently forbids the states from allowing legal sports betting, with four 
specific exceptions.
3
 Although wagering on sports is prohibited in 46 states, studies have 
estimated that as much as $380 billion changes hands per year in the United States as a result of 
illegal betting.
4
 This number is over one hundred times the amount wagered legally at Nevada 
sports books in 2011.
5
 Because states like New Jersey desire to turn this illegal activity into 
taxable business transactions, PASPA has not existed without controversy.  In 2009, Delaware 
passed a law that would have expanded the types of sports wagering activity permitted within its 
borders, and in both 2007 and 2011 private citizens (in the latter case New Jersey state 
legislators) sued to have PASPA declared unconstitutional.
6
 Presently, five major athletic 
organizations have brought suit to enjoin the implementation of the New Jersey plan to permit 
                                                          
1
 BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, Badlands, on DARKNESS ON THE EDGE OF TOWN (Columbia Records 1978).  
2
 Wayne Parry, Christie Signs Sports Betting Bill Into Law, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 17, 2012, 
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sports betting, claiming that legalized sports betting in New Jersey would threaten the integrity 
of the athletic contests they oversee.
7
 Given that New Jersey’s law violates PASPA on its face, 
the only viable defense the state has is to attack the constitutionality of the federal law. This is 
important because none of the previous three suits involving PASPA reached any constitutional 
arguments.
8
 Yet even if New Jersey’s constitutional challenge is not viable, there are numerous 
policy reasons why a repeal of PASPA should be explored. 
Part II of this Note is an overview of the history of the Professional and Amateur Sports 
Protection Act and related litigation, including the ongoing lawsuit involving the state of New 
Jersey. Part III walks through the constitutional arguments made in New Jersey’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment and again on appeal, arguments which were adopted in a dissenting 
opinion by Judge Vanaskie of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. In Part IV, the Note 
explores a number of policy arguments against PASPA’s blanket prohibition, as well as a 
number of game-fixing and point-shaving scandals that are often cited in support of banning 
sports betting. Finally, Part V argues that, even if New Jersey’s constitutional challenges lack 
merit, PASPA should be revisited in light of this challenge because of the positive effects a 
repeal or revision are likely to have on gambling enforcement, as well as on New Jersey’s 
economy. 
II. OVERVIEW OF PASPA 
A. Legislative History 
                                                          
7
 See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NCAA v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 
3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012) (complaint on behalf of Major League Baseball, the National Basketball 
Association, the National Collegiate Athletic Association, the National Football League, and the National Hockey 
League). 
8
 See generally iMEGA v. Holder, 2011 WL 802106 (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue); OFC Comm 
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On February 22, 1991, Senator Dennis DeConcini of Arizona introduced S. 474, the 
Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, which would prohibit sports gambling 
throughout the United States in locations where it did not already exist.
9
 DeConcini asserted that 
the activities he sought to ban “threaten[] the integrity and character of, and public confidence in, 
professional and amateur sports, and instill[] inappropriate values in our Nation’s youth.”10 As 
the bill passed through committee and moved closer to passage, a number of legislators spoke 
out against it, notably Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey.
11
 Senator Lautenberg expressed concern 
that the format of the bill, creating an exception by which Nevada could permit sports betting at 
its casinos, would cause serious harm to the Atlantic City, New Jersey casino industry.
12
 Senator 
Lautenberg’s criticism was undercut, however, by the passionate support the bill received from 
his fellow New Jersey senator, Bill Bradley.
13
 As a former professional basketball player, 
Senator Bradley’s credibility in opposing legalized sports betting was apparently unassailable.14 
As a champion of PASPA, Bradley seriously damaged any chance New Jersey had of 
formulating a legitimate narrative of discrimination.
15
 
President George H.W. Bush signed PASPA into law on October 28, 1992.
16
 Thanks to the 
exceptions contained in § 3703, New Jersey had the opportunity to pass a law permitting sports 
betting within one year of the date PASPA became law.
17
 As a result of the political infighting in 
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 137 CONG. REC. S2,256-04 (daily ed. Feb. 22, 1991) (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini). 
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 Id. 
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 138 CONG. REC. S7,300-01 (daily ed. June 2, 1992) (statement of Sen. Frank Lautenberg). 
12
 Id. 
13
 See generally Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act-Policy Concerns Behind Senate 
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 Joseph F. Sullivan, Gambling Debate Rages Anew Over Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 1991, 
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 28 U.S.C.A. § 3703 (West 1992). 
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the state legislature, as well as the lack of support from Senator Bradley, New Jersey did not pass 
such a law.
18
 
B. Prior Litigation 
On August 7, 2006, James Flagler, a private citizen of New Jersey, filed suit against then-
U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and Chris Christie, who at the time was the U.S. 
Attorney for the District of New Jersey, alleging that PASPA violates the 10
th
 Amendment and is 
beyond the reach of the Commerce Power.
19
 The district court ruled that the plaintiff did not 
satisfy constitutional or prudential standing requirements.
20
 Specifically, the court found that Mr. 
Flagler failed to demonstrate that the federal prohibition on sports wagering activities 
represented an “injury-in-fact,” as well as that a favorable disposition on the case would have 
adequately redressed his perceived injuries.
21
 Thus the challenge failed, but the district court did 
not establish any precedent regarding PASPA’s constitutionality. 
On May 14, 2009, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed a law that would permit 
“point spread bets…over/under bets…and…multi-game parlay bets.”22 Following a request from 
Governor Markell, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled in an advisory opinion on May 29, 2009, 
that the legislation did not violate state law.
23
 The same five entities that are plaintiffs in the 
ongoing New Jersey suit sought an injunction against the Delaware plan.
24
 The U.S. District 
Court for the District of Delaware denied the injunction and the leagues were granted an 
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 Joseph F. Sullivan, Judges in Trenton Reject Sports Betting Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1993, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/18/nyregion/judges-in-trenton-reject-sports-betting-
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 Flagler, 2007 WL 2814657, at *1. 
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 Id., at *2. 
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 Id., at *2, *3. 
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 Markell, 579 F.3d at 295. 
23
 Id. at 295, 296. 
24
 Id. at 295. 
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interlocutory appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
25
 In Markell, the Third Circuit’s 
analysis focused on the language of PASPA with regards to the exception under which Delaware 
had qualified.
26
 The opinion turns on the interpretation of a single phrase: “to the extent that the 
scheme was conducted by that State.”27 Delaware interpreted this phrase to mean that since it 
had conducted some form of sports betting, it remained eligible to conduct any other form of 
sports betting.
28
 The majority sided with the leagues’ interpretation, that the inclusion of such a 
phrase within the statute exhibited Congress’ intent to limit Delaware to precisely the scheme 
that existed at the time of the passage of PASPA.
29
 The constitutionality of PASPA was never 
raised by Governor Markell, nor addressed by the court.
30
 
On March 7, 2011, New Jersey State Senators Raymond Lesniak and Stephen Sweeney, 
in conjunction with three New Jersey Horsemen’s Associations and iMEGA, a group that 
publicizes internet gambling, brought suit against Attorney General Eric Holder and Paul 
Fishman, U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey, challenging the constitutionality of 
PASPA.
31
 The plaintiffs alleged nine counts in which Congress exceeded its constitutionally 
delegated authority in enacting PASPA.
32
 The district court found that iMEGA and the 
Horsemen’s Associations did not meet the injury-in-fact or redressability requirements to have 
standing in the case.
33
 The court also held that Senators Sweeney and Lesniak failed to satisfy 
the injury in fact and redressability requirements, as well as the requirements to achieve 
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 Id. at 301 (emphasis in original). 
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 Markell, 579 F.3d at 301. 
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 iMEGA v. Holder, No. 09CV01301, 2011 WL 802106, at *5 n.2 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011). 
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“institutional standing” under Coleman v. Miller.34 Finally, the court concluded that only 
states—rather than private individuals—have the requisite standing to make 10th Amendment 
challenges.
35
  
C. History of the New Jersey Law 
On Election Day 2011, New Jersey voters supported by a nearly two-to-one margin a 
non-binding referendum that suggested permitting sports betting at Atlantic City casinos, the 
racetracks at Monmouth Park, The Meadowlands, Freehold Raceway, the Atlantic City Race 
Course, and a former track in Cherry Hill.
36
 In the face of such overwhelming support, an 
amendment to the New Jersey State Constitution was passed, establishing the constitutionality of 
a future law permitting sports betting.
37
 On November 21, 2011, Senator Raymond Lesniak 
introduced a bill in the New Jersey State Senate “permit[ting] wagering at casinos and racetracks 
on certain professional and collegiate sports or athletics events.”38 One week later, on November 
28, Assemblyman John Burzichelli sponsored an identical version of Lesniak’s bill.39 In the 
statement accompanying the initial drafts, legislators established tax rates to be paid by casinos 
and racetracks on future sports book income, as well as the conditions that would apply to the 
state’s newfound tax revenues.40 The bulk of tax revenues paid to the state will fund programs 
for senior citizens and individuals with disabilities.
41
 A small percentage will fund community 
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 iMEGA, 2011 WL 802106, at *6, *7 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011) (citing 307 U.S. 433 (1939)). 
35
 Id. at *8, *9. 
36
 Wayne Parry, NJ voters: We want to bet on sports if US says yes, ASSOCIATED PRESS, November 9, 2011, 
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 S. 3113, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011). 
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 A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. 2011). 
40
 A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Nov. 28, 2011). 
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and economic development projects throughout the state and a percentage of the registration fee 
paid by the casinos and racetracks will fund treatment programs for compulsive gamblers.
42
   
The bill went through two revisions in the New Jersey State Assembly, the more notable 
of the two eliminating the ability of patrons to place bets with licensed entities through use of the 
internet or other electronic devices.
43
 The Assembly bill replaced its Senate counterpart as the 
final version on January 9, 2012, and passed by a unanimous vote on the same day.
44
 On January 
17, 2012, Governor Chris Christie signed the final version of the bill into law, officially defying 
PASPA.
45
 In public statements, Assemblyman Burzichelli explained that “sports gaming is 
already taking place, but the only people taking advantage of it are bookies and criminal 
enterprises. This opens the door for New Jersey to implement well-regulated sports gambling.”46 
In an attempt to aid New Jersey’s efforts to make legalized sports wagering a reality, 
Congressmen Frank Pallone, Jr. and Frank LoBiondo introduced two bills in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, one that would exempt New Jersey from PASPA and another that would grant 
all states a four year window—terminating on January 1, 2016—in which to pass laws legalizing 
sports betting.
47
 Both bills were assigned to committee on January 23, 2012, and as of this 
writing both have yet to be reported out of committee.
48
   
D. Sports League Seek to Enjoin NJ Law 
                                                          
42
 Id. 
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 A.B. 4385, 214th Leg., 1st Ann. Sess. (N.J. Jan. 17, 2012) (omissions from §§ 2(d), (e)). 
44
 Bills 2010-2011, NEW JERSEY LEGISLATURE,  
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Into Law, TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 17, 2012 (Lexis). 
47
 Press Release, Rep. Frank Pallone, Jr., Pallone and LoBiondo Team Up to Bring Sports Gaming to New Jersey 
(Apr. 26, 2012) (Lexis). 
48
 H.R. 3797: Sports Gaming Opportunity Act of 2012, GOVTRACK, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3797 (last accessed Oct. 23, 2012); H.R. 3809: New Jersey Betting and 
Equal Treatment Act of 2012, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr3809 (last accessed Oct. 23, 
2012). 
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On August 7, 2012, the National Basketball Association, the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association, the National Football League, the National Hockey League and Major League 
Baseball filed suit to enjoin the implementation of the New Jersey Law.
49
 The plaintiffs allege a 
single injury, specifically that New Jersey’s law violates PASPA.50 The leagues base their claim 
of injury on the assertion that if wagering on the outcomes of their games is permitted, “[their] 
reputation and goodwill will be irreparably damaged…including but not limited to the fact that 
the proliferation of sports gambling will adversely affect the way that the public views amateur 
and professional sports.”51 The suit seeks declarations that the law and the as-yet-unwritten 
regulations violate federal law, and an injunction preventing the implementation of both.
52
 
Days later, on August 10, the plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and alternatively a 
preliminary injunction “to preserve the status quo pending a final decision on the merits of their 
claim.”53 The leagues assert that they are entitled to summary judgment because the New Jersey 
law explicitly violates PASPA.
54
 Further, the leagues assert that PASPA does not violate the 
Commerce Power, the Equal Protection Clause, or the 10
th
 Amendment, and they seek to 
permanently enjoin New Jersey from implementing its law.
55
 Alternatively, the leagues seek to 
enjoin implementation of the law to preserve the status quo until a decision is reached on the 
merits of the lawsuit.
56
 
                                                          
49
 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, NCAA v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 
(D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012). 
50
 Id. at ¶ 32. 
51
 Id. at ¶ 34. 
52
 Id. at ¶ 35. 
53
 Brief in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and, If Necessary, to Preserve the Status Quo, a 
Preliminary Injunction, NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 3964728, *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 10, 2012). 
54
 Id. 
55
 See id. 
56
 Id. 
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The state of New Jersey filed its response on September 7, 2012 in the form of a motion 
to dismiss the suit for lack of standing.
57
 The state asserted that the leagues failed to allege a 
sufficient “injury-in-fact” as required by the U.S. Constitution.58 Further, the state argued that the 
claimed injury was not “fairly traceable” to the law in question.59 New Jersey also contended that 
Congress, while creating a private right of action, may not lower the threshold for standing 
beneath the “floor” that exists pursuant to Article III.60 
On October 15, 2012, New Jersey published final regulations for sports betting that 
permit the New Jersey Division of Gaming Enforcement to accept license applications and grant 
licenses as soon as January 9, 2013.
61
 U.S. District Judge Michael Shipp heard oral arguments on 
the standing issue on December 18, 2012.
62
  Judge Shipp ruled that the leagues do in fact have 
standing to sue by meeting all three requirements,
63
 and a subsequent round of oral arguments on 
dueling motions for summary judgment took place on February 14, 2013.
64
 On February 1, 2013, 
the U.S. Department of Justice joined the suit and filed a brief in support of the constitutionality 
of PASPA.
65
 On February 28, 2013, Judge Shipp granted the sports leagues’ motion for 
summary judgment, declaring that PASPA is in fact constitutional.
66
 New Jersey took an 
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 Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), NCAA v. Christie, No. 
3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 3964552, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2012). 
58
 Id. 
59
 Id. 
60
 Brief in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1), NCAA v. Christie, No. 
3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 3964552, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 2012). 
61
 Donald Wittkowski, Final regulation approved for sports betting in New Jersey, THE PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, 
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Oct. 23, 2012 (Lexis). 
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 National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Christie, No. 12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6698684, at *4-9 (D.N.J. Dec. 21, 
2012). 
64
 Brent Johnson, U.S. justice department dismisses N.J.’s claim that sports betting ban is unconstitutional, THE 
STAR-LEDGER, Feb. 2, 2013, http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/02/us_justice_department_dismisse.html. 
65
 Id. 
66
 NCAA v. Christie, No. 12-4947, 2013 WL 772679 (D.N.J. Feb. 28, 2013). 
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expedited appeal to the Third Circuit,
67
 and although Judge Shipp’s judgment was affirmed, one 
member of the panel accepted New Jersey’s arguments that PASPA does not legislate evenly 
amongst the several states.
68
 
III. NEW JERSEY’S CLAIMS THAT PASPA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
New Jersey’s initial cross-motion for summary judgment pointedly challenged the 
standing of the plaintiffs and raised a number of constitutional arguments against PASPA.
69
 New 
Jersey asserted that PASPA violates the Tenth Amendment, exceeds Congress’ Commerce 
Power, and deprives the 46 states not exempted by PASPA of both due process and equal 
protection.
70
 Judge Shipp denied New Jersey’s motion, and the Third Circuit affirmed his 
decision, but as one of three Third Circuit judges agreed with pieces of New Jersey’s argument 
for PASPA’s unconstitutionality, and other states have commenced the process to potentially 
pass laws similar to that of New Jersey’s, it is reasonable to presume that the Supreme Court will 
address each argument in this case at some point in the future. 
A. Tenth Amendment 
The language of the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from intruding on areas 
reserved for the states.
71
 During the legislative process that created PASPA, Senator Chuck 
Grassley voiced his concerns that PASPA intruded upon an area traditionally reserved to the 
states.
72
 Grassley argued—accurately—that the regulation of lotteries and casino gaming has 
                                                          
67
 Christopher Baxter, Christie administration files notice of appeal in federal sports betting case, THE STAR 
LEDGER, March 13, 2013, http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2013/03/christie_administration_files.html. 
68
 NCAA v. Christie, 730 F.3d 208, 241 (3d Cir. 2013). 
69
 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, NCAA v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 
2012). 
70
 Id. at II(A-C). 
71
 U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
72
 S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 12 (1992). 
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traditionally been a state concern, and asserted that it would be a serious overreach for the 
federal government to tell the states how they may or may not raise revenue.
73
 Thus far, 
opponents of PASPA have found it difficult to mount a challenge on Tenth Amendment grounds 
because of the difficulties of establishing standing—the reason why the challenges in both 
Flagler and iMEGA failed without reaching the merits.
74
 In the instant case, however, the parties 
challenging PASPA are the defendants,
75
 eliminating that procedural hurdle. 
New Jersey argues that the plain language of PASPA violates the “anti-commandeering” 
principle protected by the Tenth Amendment and established in New York v. United States.
76
  
Since New Jersey law permits sports wagering to be conducted by licensed casinos and 
racetracks,
77
 PASPA—by virtue of the Supremacy Clause78—requires state officials to 
implement the federal scheme rather than the laws of New Jersey. Congress does not have the 
power to direct states to regulate their own citizens.
79
 By its terms, PASPA does not outlaw 
sports wagering activity, but rather it prevents states from making sports wagering legal.
80
 While 
Congress is permitted to restrict the behavior of a state,
81
 New Jersey is not proposing to run any 
                                                          
73
 Id. 
74
 See discussion of Flagler and iMEGA, supra Part I. 
75
 NCAA v. Christie, No. CV124947, 2012 WL 3171566, at *1 (D.N.J. Aug. 7, 2012). 
76
 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The essence of the “anti-commandeering  principle” is that if Congress directs state 
legislatures to act in a certain way, the usual recourse that exists in the democratic system is taken away from the 
citizens of the state in question. For example, if the citizens of New Jersey supported legal sports betting by a two-
to-one majority, but the state legislature disagreed, voters would subsequently have the opportunity to remove from 
office those with whom they disagreed and replace them with pro- sports betting state legislators. Such recourse is 
unavailable at the national level. Frank Lautenberg and Robert Menendez are but two of one hundred members of 
the Senate, and New Jersey’s twelve Representatives, although one of the largest delegations in the House, leave 
423 seats for which the citizens of New Jersey do not vote. 
77
 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012). 
78
 U.S. CONST. art. VI § 2. “This Constitution. . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” 
79
 New York, 505 U.S. at 188. 
80
 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 3702 (West 1992) (“It shall be unlawful for a governmental entity to sponsor, operate . . 
.betting, gambling, or wagering scheme based. . .on one or more competitive games in which amateur or 
professional athletes participate. . . .”). 
81
 Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000). 
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sports betting operations itself.
82
 The state even acknowledges that prohibiting “only State-run or 
State-sponsored sports betting” would be consistent with New York v. United States, and 
suggests an alternate construction of the statute to limit its prohibition to such State-run 
schemes.
83
 
B. Commerce Clause 
The “Applicability” section of PASPA creates a number of very specific exceptions to 
the blanket prohibition on sports betting.
84
 In fact, these exceptions were expressly contemplated 
to exempt the four states to which they apply, as well as potentially New Jersey.
85
 New Jersey 
rests its Commerce Clause arguments on the idea that there exists a “fundamental principle that 
all the States enjoy equal sovereignty.”86 The claim is that PASPA violates this principle because 
it does not target a “local evil” and its “disparate geographic coverage is [not] sufficiently related 
to the problem that it targets.”87 Prior to enacting PASPA, congressional findings concluded that 
“[w]ithout Federal legislation, sports gambling is likely to spread on a piecemeal basis and 
ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.”88 Per New Jersey’s arguments, this finding tends 
to demonstrate that Congress did not consider sports wagering a purely “local evil.” New Jersey 
argues that the kind of “grandfathering” undertaken by PASPA is generally only permitted to 
assist with incremental reforms, rather than existing permanently to treat states differently.
89
 As a 
result, the precedent set by PASPA could be extended by Congress to limit any form of business 
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 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-2 (West 2012). 
83
 Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Summary Judgment, NCAA v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1, II(A)(1)(3) 
(D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2012) (hereinafter “Defendants’ Cross-Motion”). 
84
 28 U.S.C.A. § 3704 (West 1992). 
85
 138 Cong. Rec. H11,756-02 (daily Ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of Rep. William Hughes). 
86
 Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). 
87
 Id. 
88
 S. Rep. No. 102-248, at 5 (1991). 
89
 Defendants’ Cross-Motion, NCAA v. Christie, No. 3:12-cv-04947, 2012 WL 6020639, at *1, II(B) (quoting 
Delaware River Basin Comm’n v. Bucks Cnty. Water & Sewer Auth., 641 F.2d 1087, 1098 (3d Cir. 1981)). 
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or manufacturing to states in which it already takes place.
90
 The Supreme Court has apparently 
abandoned the idea that there is a uniformity requirement within the Commerce Clause, but has 
never expressly held as such.
91
  
C. Due Process and Equal Protection 
Finally, New Jersey argues that, in cases where the Supreme Court has declined to 
acknowledge the Uniformity Requirement, the Court has recognized that the claimed 
discrimination may be “of such an injurious character as to bring into operation the due process 
clause of the Fifth Amendment.”92 PASPA is not a “facially neutral” statute, as the exemptions 
contained within explicitly contemplate the states to which they apply.
93
 As New Jersey argues, 
what Congress did with PASPA was identify an issue that it sought to remedy, and then ban the 
problem behavior solely in the places where it was already illegal.
94
 Such a ban, per the 
Defendants, denies New Jersey a substantial amount of revenue while four other states enjoy a 
federally-sanctioned monopoly.
95
 Further, such discrimination by the federal government is only 
permissible “where the ‘statute’s disparate geographic coverage is sufficiently related to the 
problem it targets.’”96 The claim here is that the geographic coverage of PASPA is essentially 
inversely related to the problem it targets by banning sports betting exclusively in jurisdictions 
where bans already existed. 
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The state claims that there is not even a rational basis for believing that the passage of a 
law permitting sports gambling in New Jersey was not injurious to the public interest in 1992, 
but had become so in 2012.
97
 Rational basis review is a form of scrutiny used by the Supreme 
Court to assess the validity of commercial legislation that has the effect of unfairly 
discriminating amongst groups of people.
98
 Although this is the most deferential form of scrutiny 
undertaken by the Supreme Court, it is still a standard that must be met by challenged legislation. 
IV. POLICY ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST PASPA 
A. Gambling Laws in the United States Have Consistently Evolved from 
Outright Prohibition to Close and Careful Regulation 
 Gambling has existed in various forms since the dawn of human history, as people have 
consistently sought out activities that involve risks and rewards.
99
  Yet throughout most, if not 
all, of the history of the United States there have existed large and passionate movements to 
eliminate it from society.
100
 As a result, laws and regulations concerning gambling in its 
multitude of forms have evolved continuously over the past four hundred years at the local, state 
and national levels.
101
 Prior to 1978, Nevada was the only state in which casino gaming legally 
took place.
102
 As of this writing, legal casino gaming exists in thirty eight out of fifty states.
103
 In 
the 1840s and 1850s, a large number of states banned lotteries that had existed for any number of 
years.
104
 Even the United States Supreme Court weighed in, referring to lotteries as “element[s] 
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that will be confessedly injurious to the public morals.”105 Eventually, lotteries ceased to exist in 
the United States until they were revived when New Hampshire created a biannual lottery in 
1963.
106
 As of this writing, forty three states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. 
Virgin Islands all operate and regulate their own lotteries in at least one form.
107
   
 While casino gaming and lotteries have gained prominence and legal legitimacy in recent 
decades, PASPA moved the regulation of sports wagering in the opposite direction. As described 
above, each form of gambling was at one time similarly situated to the others, ruled illegal by 
many states but available to the public in certain others. Then in 1992, before the vast majority of 
states had the opportunity to explore the sports wagering environment, PASPA eliminated the 
practice nationwide.
108
 As noted by Senator Chuck Grassley during the debate over PASPA, the 
federal ban on sports wagering is essentially the only time that the federal government has 
involved itself in the direct regulation of gambling activities.
109
 The absolute historical veracity 
of Grassley’s statement notwithstanding, it is the case that in 2013, with the exception of the 
regulation of gambling on Native American lands,
110
 the regulation of lotteries, casinos and 
racetracks is presently carried out on a state-by-state basis, rather than by the federal 
government.
111
 Independent of the question of whether a unique federal ban such as PASPA 
violates the Tenth Amendment or another tenet of the Constitution, it is counterintuitive that 
governmental treatment of sports betting has followed the reverse trajectory of other forms of 
gambling activity. 
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B. Sports Betting, Like Narcotics and Alcohol, Becomes Far More Lucrative 
When Illegal 
Despite PASPA’s blanket prohibition on sports wagering, a 1999 study estimated that as 
much as $380 billion changed hands in that year alone as a result of illegal sports betting.
112
 In 
contrast, customers wagered $2.88 billion legally at Nevada sports books in 2011.
113
 If illegal 
wagering outnumbers legal sports wagering activity in the United States by a factor of nearly one 
hundred thirty two to one, it would appear that PASPA has failed. This situation represents an 
example of an attempt to legislate a certain “immoral” behavior in the United States falling well 
short of its intended result of eliminating that behavior.  During Prohibition, incredible amounts 
of money could be made dealing in illegal liquor. Since the mid-1960s, the “War on Drugs” has 
only served to make narcotics trafficking more lucrative. And PASPA, despite what the major 
sports leagues would have the public believe, actually makes it easier to question the integrity of 
athletic contests by de-regulating sports wagering activity and creating opportunities for 
organized crime to flourish. 
There are numerous examples of violence that emerges from the organized crime 
domination of illegal gambling of all kinds. When New York City closed its Off Track Betting 
parlors in December of 2010, crime syndicates across the five boroughs gladly stepped in to 
handle the action.
114
 In and around South Philadelphia in the late 1980s and early 1990s, small-
time bookmakers often outperformed mob-connected bookies to the point where the Scarfo 
crime family attempted to put a stop to their businesses, by force.
115
 Crews of thugs employed by 
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the syndicate broke into the home of one bookie, duct-taping him to a chair and striking him with 
a pistol repeatedly to “encourage” payment of protection money.116 As the dominant force in 
“underground” activities in the area, the Philadelphia mob would not stand for others crowding 
out their business, and since their targets weren’t likely to go to the police, their options were 
expansive. At the other end of the spectrum, one well-known bookie in the area earned the 
nickname “The Gentleman Gambler” because it was so out of the ordinary for someone in his 
position to not engage in physical coercion to ensure repayment of debts.
117
 In Chicago, 
organized crime factions make more money from bookmaking operations than from any other 
source.
118
 So profitable is this business that they too will stop at nothing to prevent anyone from 
stealing even miniscule profits from them, in one instance resorting to blowing up a competitor’s 
van with him inside.
119
 PASPA, by keeping the world of sports betting in the shadows, enables 
bookies to essentially torture clients into paying back debts, and encourages violent intimidation 
tactics between competitors attempting to monopolize the trade in a given geographic area. 
The organized crime that thrives as a result of PASPA is the modern relative of early 
twentieth century bootleggers. From 1920 until 1933, the sale, manufacture and transportation of 
alcohol were forbidden in the United States.
120
 Rather than eliminating the consumption of 
alcohol as intended, Prohibition created an underground market for alcohol, a supply vacuum 
into which a number of sophisticated criminal enterprises gladly stepped.
121
 Al Capone, arguably 
the most famous criminal in U.S. history, gained every ounce of his fame and fortune by flouting 
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the law brazenly and openly.
122
 Eventually, the situation became so untenable and the ban so 
impractical that the Twenty-First Amendment repealed Prohibition on December 5, 1933.
123
 At 
this point a small number of bootleggers continued in the industry, but a majority left the liquor 
business altogether.
124
 In fact, one of the most popular—and profitable—pursuits of the criminal 
underworld following Prohibition was the gambling racket.
125
 
In the second half of the twentieth century, a new form of Prohibition exists against a 
different caliber of illicit substances. Since approximately July 1969, the United States 
government has engaged in a large-scale campaign to eliminate the drug trade both within the 
U.S. and abroad.
126
 Despite billions of dollars spent on this elusive goal throughout the ensuing 
four-plus decades, statistics point to these efforts being for naught.
127
 The “War on Drugs” has 
had an effect similar to Prohibition in enhancing the monetary incentive for groups of individuals 
to get into the business of providing illegal goods.
128
 The business has become so lucrative as a 
result of Draconian enforcement efforts that groups bearing little to no resemblance to the 
traditional mafia have entered the equation and earned themselves a substantial profit while 
perpetrating horrific acts of violence to maintain—and expand—their market share.129 
C. Game-Fixing and Point-Shaving Have Created Huge Scandals In Multiple 
Sports 
In spite of the historical evidence that prohibiting activities only makes them more 
profitable and by extension less honest, the plaintiffs in NCAA v. Christie insist that legal sports 
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wagering would harm the integrity of the games they facilitate.
130
 It would appear that they have 
a perfect example of their theory in Tim Donaghy. Donaghy was a National Basketball 
Association referee who bet on NBA games, including games to which he was personally 
assigned, and additionally provided inside information about games to friends who subsequently 
placed their own bets.
131
 Donaghy pled guilty to two federal conspiracy counts,
132
 and he 
received a sentence of fifteen months in prison.
133
 The plaintiffs argue that legalizing sports 
gambling will create more Tim Donaghys.
134
 On the other hand, if sports wagering were legal 
and completely transparent, it would be far easier to monitor and regulate, forcing any potential 
Donaghy copycats out of the shadows and drastically reducing the danger of certain groups of 
people placing bets on games.
135
 
 Further, the most famous “point-shaving” scandals in U.S. history have involved college 
players, individuals who would require a lower monetary incentive to become involved in illicit 
activity.
136
 Point shaving involves conduct by players (or officials) during a game that does not 
affect the outcome, but alters the margin of victory so that the losing team “covers the spread.”137 
The two most notorious point shaving scandals in U.S. history involved the 1950-51 City 
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College of New York (“CCNY”) basketball team and the 1978-79 Boston College basketball 
team.
138
 Although it is logical to presume that unpaid collegiate athletes are more susceptible to 
the pressures potentially exerted by individuals looking to control the outcome of games, it is 
important to view these scandals in the proper context.  Both the CCNY
139
 and the Boston 
College
140
 scandals involved local, small-time gangsters with personal connections to the players 
in question. In a world where wagering on sports was and is illegal in the jurisdiction in which 
these men resided, the point-shaving schemes they operated were an easy way to make a quick 
buck without any corporate competition. 
In February 2013, as NCAA v. Christie awaited a decision by Judge Shipp on the motions 
for summary judgment, match-fixing in international soccer suddenly grabbed global 
headlines.
141
 Criminal syndicates throughout Asia allegedly influenced the outcome of 680 
matches in the years from 2009-2012,
142
 including matches as prominent as the group stage of 
the UEFA Champions League.
143
 That the world’s most popular sport, and more specifically that 
sport’s most popular annual competition, could be infiltrated in such a way is a major story, but 
for the purposes of this Note the most important factor is that the groups fixing these matches are 
also betting on them legally, seemingly undercutting arguments that legal betting reduces the risk 
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of match-fixing.
144
 These criminals place their bets in legitimate sports books, mostly located in 
Manila, which eschew regulation in favor of volume, allowing for the kinds of profits that make 
match-fixing a worthwhile risk.
145
  
D. Open and Well-Regulated Gambling Would Have Inhibited Historic 
“Fixing” Scandals 
In the case of Tim Donaghy, there is no guarantee that he would have been prevented 
from betting on games that he officiated had legal gambling existed, but the likelihood that he 
would have gotten away with it for so long is greatly diminished. The overwhelming majority of 
sports wagering that occurs in the United States today is under the table.
146
 PASPA’s ban on 
sports wagering creates a serious monetary incentive for individuals or groups to facilitate illicit 
gambling by members of the general public, as the demand remains as high as ever and the risk 
creates premium prices for the service. Furthermore, this world of neighborhood bookies and 
cash transactions is incredibly difficult for law enforcement to track.
147
 Conversely, wagering 
done at Las Vegas sports books, and casinos and racetracks anywhere is subject to an incredible 
amount of scrutiny.
148
 Large wins always garner some kind of inquiry into their legitimacy, even 
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when accomplished by someone who is expected to win.
149
 Las Vegas sports books are also 
reluctant to accept inordinately large wagers, and are known to lower their limits and engage 
every ounce of their surveillance might on those who place large wagers.
150
 Concededly, 
Michael Konik’s account of his time “running money” for a big time gambler shows exactly how 
individuals with enough resources can get around these limitations. Yet Konik’s story also makes 
clear just how quickly suspicion fell on him simply because of the amount of money he wagered 
at a given time.
151
 The suspicion Konik received rose and fell proportionally with his successes 
and failures, which hovered around fifty five percent.
152
 While it is completely accurate to say 
that game fixing still could exist in a world with widespread legal sports betting, these 
examples—and others below—show that legalization, regulation and scrutiny make that risk 
exceedingly minimal. 
Also instructive to consider is the personality of today’s big-time legal gambler. The 
individuals who engage in the high-stakes wagering that Las Vegas casinos fear are supremely 
competitive, but they are not the type of people that attempt to win at all costs.
153
 Rather, these 
individuals want to win as a result of being the best at what they do and by being smarter than 
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everyone else, motivations that carry a certain amount of inherent integrity.
154
 The big time legal 
sports bettor sees himself as no different from a hedge fund manager or day trader, attempting to 
predict which sides will make the most money and trusting that research, skill, and exploiting 
market inefficiency result in winnings that exceed losses.
155
 
Another important consideration is the difficulty of fixing a game or shaving points in 
today’s high-compensation—and information-saturated—sporting environment. The most 
famous game-fixing scandal of all time involved the 1919 Chicago White Sox “throwing” the 
World Series against the Cincinnati Reds.
156
 Gangster Arnold Rothstein paid eight members of 
the White Sox $10,000 each to allow the Reds to win.
157
 Despite being the far superior team 
based upon both talent and that season’s performance, the White Sox fell to the Reds five games 
to three.
158
 The two best players on the White Sox, Ed Cicotte and Joe Jackson, who were both 
involved in the scandal, each made $6,000 per year.
159
 By involving themselves in Rothstein’s 
plot, the two best players on the team—individuals who are arguably essential if one wants to be 
certain of influencing the outcome of a best-of-seven series
160—nearly doubled their yearly 
salaries. In contrast, the eight lowest-paid players on the 2012 World Series champion San 
Francisco Giants each made between $480,000 and $483,000.
161
 Given that legal sports books 
are loath to permit wagers higher than risking $55,000 to win $50,000 on a single professional 
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game,
162
 it would not be cost-effective to gamblers to pay eight U.S. professional athletes—and 
especially the higher-compensated and higher-profile players necessary to a successful fix—a 
sufficient amount of money to induce them to throw away the opportunity of winning a 
championship.  
As far as college athletics are concerned, the Boston College and CCNY situations are 
easily contrasted with the experience of the University of Nevada-Las Vegas (“UNLV”) 
basketball program. Although constantly under investigation by the NCAA for violations—real 
and alleged—of rules governing recruiting and the amateur status of student-athletes,163 and once 
the subject of a federal probe regarding connections to a known game-fixer,
164
 UNLV has never 
been connected by concrete evidence to gambling activity or point shaving.
165
 This example 
more than any others should show how legal and highly regulated sports wagering eliminates the 
incentive for individuals who possess the proclivity to alter the outcome of games to stay in 
business.  
As an aside, the mere fact that UNLV is permitted to exist and compete in intercollegiate 
athletics underscores the hypocrisy of the NCAA in signing on to the lawsuit against New Jersey. 
The NCAA does maintain a policy preventing states where single-game betting is legal from 
hosting any part of a national championship, but any injury that the organization claims in the 
instant lawsuit is fallacious in light of the continued existence of the UNLV athletic program, as 
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well as the fact that the NCAA has permitted repeated iterations of the Mountain West 
Conference Men’s Basketball Tournament, 21 (and counting) annual “Las Vegas Bowls”, and 
the 2013 Pacific-12 Conference Men’s Basketball Tournament to take place in the heart of Las 
Vegas.
166
 If the NCAA would suffer a concrete and particularized injury in New Jersey, how has 
it not suffered such injury to this point in Nevada?  
The international soccer scandal is slightly more vexing in light of the fact that the 
criminal syndicates engaging in match-fixing place their bets legally. But the atmosphere in 
which these bets are placed is a far cry from the pervasive regulatory scheme that undoubtedly 
would be a part of legalized sports betting in New Jersey. This chaotic culture allows individuals 
such as Wilson Perumal to place massive wagers, as well as fix and bet on matches in the third or 
fourth division of obscure nations not known for footballing prowess, all without arousing much 
suspicion.
167
 The obscurity of the vast majority of the supposedly fixed matches is the perfect 
cover, but would be unavailable to gamblers within the United States. As Michael Konik’s 
experiences again exemplify, both the most popular and least popular events have lower betting 
limits and are subject to more scrutiny before a single wager is placed.
168
 If an individual walked 
into a sports book at Monmouth Park Raceway and attempted to wager $55,000 on a USL 
PRO—the third division of professional soccer in the United States—match between the 
Rochester Rhinos and the Harrisburg City Islanders, there would be an immediate inquiry and 
any match-fixing would be discovered and eliminated. 
V. CONGRESS SHOULD REPEAL PASPA OR REVISE THE BAN TO ALLOW 
NEW JERSEY TO MOVE FORWARD 
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A. New Jersey’s Constitutional Challenges, Already Denied Once, Do Not 
Appear Destined For Success 
On February 28, 2013, Judge Michael Shipp granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary 
judgment, enjoining implementation of New Jersey’s proposed sports betting regulations.169 
Judge Shipp reasoned that PASPA is an appropriate use of the Commerce Power, that it does not 
force New Jersey to act in a certain way, and that Congress had a rational basis to enact PASPA 
in the way that it did.
170
 On September 17, 2013, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed Judge Shipp’s grant of summary judgment to the sports league plaintiffs by a vote of 2-
1.
171
 
Regarding New Jersey’s Commerce Clause arguments, the state puts itself at a 
disadvantage by availing itself of an argument that does not appear to have been accepted by the 
Supreme Court since 1923.
172
 However, if New Jersey’s interpretation of the uniformity concept 
is accurate, and the idea is merely dormant rather than explicitly rejected, one would think that 
they could have a few sympathetic ears on the Supreme Court. As the argument for a uniformity 
requirement is one rooted in textualism and analysis of the Framers’ intent,173 even someone 
with a perfunctory understanding of the Court’s current composition could make the educated 
guess that there are at least a few justices who would be open to any legal theories—grounded in 
legitimate precedent, of course—that would limit Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause. 
Although scholars proposing to revisit the uniformity principle concede that such an 
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interpretation is not wholly consistent with Justice Scalia’s brand of originalism,174 it is not 
outlandish to think that these arguments would get the attention of Justice Scalia and others. 
As economic legislation, a review of PASPA on equal protection grounds would likely be 
rational basis review.
175
 Yet as New Jersey’s brief reminds us, “[t]hough the rational basis test is 
deferential, it ‘is not a toothless one.’”176 In fact, in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court 
asserted that “[they] have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state 
interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law that 
discriminates among groups of persons.”177 The stated purpose of PASPA is to curtail sports 
betting in this country because such behavior “threatens to change the nature of sporting events 
from wholesome entertainment for all ages to devices for gambling.”178 The Senate report makes 
clear that there is a heavy dose of morality behind the push to ban sports betting.
179
 Congress’ 
desire to cure what it believed to be a moral evil may not, under established precedent, justify 
discriminating against the state of New Jersey in its desire to raise revenue, while permitting the 
very same activity to go on unfettered in Nevada. 
Although the “equal footing” arguments put forth by New Jersey have not gained 
traction, the Tenth Amendment arguments have not fallen on deaf ears. Although these 
arguments were not successful on appeal, Judge Thomas Vanaskie wrote a dissenting opinion in 
which he posited that PASPA is unconstitutional because it impermissibly commandeers the 
New Jersey state government for federal purposes.
180
  The text of PASPA’s prohibition can be 
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interpreted as telling state legislatures how to legislate, but the plain meaning of the statute is 
more suggestive of an outright prohibition of a specific activity.
181
 Judge Vanaskie points out 
that all other forms of gambling activity are presently—and for most of history have been—
regulated by individual states, which would mean that the federal government has intruded on an 
area traditionally reserved for the states.
182
 Because other forms of gambling are governed by 
state law, the average person is likely to believe that sports betting is so governed.
183
 Thus, if 
citizens possess a strong desire for legal sports betting—and the 2011 referendum says that they 
do—it stands to reason that they would take out their frustrations on state legislators who are 
“denying” them such an opportunity. This would insulate federal legislators from the 
consequences of passing an unpopular law, which is the essence of the Supreme Court’s anti-
commandeering jurisprudence.
184
 New Jersey would have a stronger argument if PASPA 
required state and local authorities to enforce its terms,
185
 rather than the FBI,
186
 but Judge 
Vanaskie’s point is well taken. He further points out that the language of PASPA specifically 
prohibits states from licensing sports betting operations, rather than simply prohibiting sports 
betting.
187
 This directive to refrain from acting, per Judge Vanaskie, is no different from 
requiring states to act in a certain way, which was ruled unconstitutional in New York and 
Printz.
188
 There is no federal regulatory scheme governing sports betting that preempts state-by-
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state regulation, but instead PASPA “set federal parameters as to how states may regulate sports 
gambling.”189  
B. How New Jersey Stands To Gain 
Although New Jersey faces an uphill battle in its attempt to declare PASPA 
unconstitutional, the arguments are there. Judge Vanaskie feels that PASPA impermissibly 
commandeers state apparatus to fulfill the will of Congress, and with the possibility that other 
states will follow New Jersey’s example, the Supreme Court should want to put a final 
disposition on this issue. Yet regardless of the constitutionality of the law, it would behoove 
Congress to utilize PASPA’s newfound publicity to examine just how practical and necessary the 
ban actually is.  The history of laws governing other forms of gambling, as well as the 
prohibition of alcohol and the War on Drugs have shown that permission in conjunction with 
close regulation destroys the incentives for illegal activity. 
If one divides the $388 billion estimate—the amount of money believed to be wagered 
illegally each year—by forty-six—the number of states where sports wagering is presently 
illegal—it can be estimated that New Jersey sports books would see approximately $8.4 billion 
wagered annually.
190
 It is unlikely that such a figure is wholly accurate, given that it represents a 
300 percent increase over what is annually wagered in Las Vegas,
191
 but it is the best estimate 
that can be made from data that presently exists. Further, New Jersey’s proximity to New York 
City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington, D.C., and Boston does provide a much larger pool of 
rabid sports fans and potential bettors than the population centers within a similar radius of Las 
Vegas. If it is an accurate estimate, one can expect gross revenue for New Jersey sports books to 
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be around $412.3 million annually, based on the fact that Nevada sports books generate revenue 
at around 4.9 percent of the total amount wagered.
192
 New Jersey’s current tax rate on “gross 
gaming revenue”—the amount a casino takes in after paying guest winnings—is 8 percent, with 
an additional option of a 1.25 percent community investment alternative or a 2.5 percent 
investment alternative.
193
 The original sports wagering bill states that sports wagering revenues 
will be subject to both the 8 percent tax and the 1.25 percent community investment 
alternative.
194
 Nine and one-fourth percent of $412.3 million yields estimated annual tax revenue 
for the state of New Jersey of $38.1 million.  This figure would represent a 13.7 percent increase 
over 2011 New Jersey tax revenues from gaming.
195
 These numbers take on added importance in 
light of the fact that state income from casino taxes in New Jersey dropped by 9.6 percent in 
fiscal year 2011 compared to fiscal year 2010.
196
 Further, the regulations published by the state 
as of October 15, 2012, would require locations that apply for licenses to pay a $50,000 
registration fee, as well as a continued “resubmission fee” of $50,000 every five years.197 As 
there are twelve casinos in Atlantic City and four racetracks that are eligible for licenses,
198
 New 
Jersey stands to gain up to $800,000 in these fees in 2014, 2019, 2024 and beyond, with a certain 
percentage of that money going towards compulsive gambling treatment and prevention 
programs. As small as these numbers appear in the context of New Jersey’s 2012 budget of $31.7 
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billion,
199
 it would help to close the 6.8 percent gap between New Jersey’s 2011 and 2012 
budgets.
200
 Legal sports betting in New Jersey will provide a significant economic benefit to the 
state, a major reason why Governor Christie is such a staunch supporter of the measure. 
Given recent developments in potentially expanding the legality of internet gaming, 
Congress would be well-served by examining the inconsistency of gambling regulation in this 
country. Whether it is re-opening the grace period to allow New Jersey to pass appropriate 
legislation, or opening the possibility of legal sports betting in all 50 states, any move to cut back 
on PASPA’s prohibition would be a revenue booster for the affected states with minimal 
downside if enacted appropriately. The potential developments in this saga should have 
Federalism scholars—not to mention sports fans and wise guys across New Jersey—paying rapt 
attention for years to come. 
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